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all of which had significant effects on defense issues and the overall budget. The Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) was the first topic I researched for CRS and, after observing how it contained many of the tradeoffs that are involved in Congressional decision-making as well as its importance to the Air Force and Army, it became the topic for this research. While this paper makes some recommendations for Air Force actions regarding the program in the near future, I
attempted to frame the issues and actions surrounding the JCA from a Congressional perspective.
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Introduction
Logistics are a critical part of successful warfighting, especially the important task of putting needed supplies in the hands of troops in the midst of battle. Despite vast improvements in technology over the past few decades, and an entire combatant command devoted to the movement of personnel and supplies around the globe, there remains the challenge of pushing vital cargo from collection points to the edges of the battlefield, what the Army calls delivering over the "last tactical mile." Recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan stressed and sometimes overwhelmed Army cargo helicopters performing this task, and highlighted limitations in their small fleet of aging fixed-wing cargo aircraft. The Army's push for a new fixed-wing airlifter to meet this need, and the path that the program has taken since then are the focus of this study.
The program, now known as the Joint Cargo Aircraft, has followed a somewhat tortured path and is now being procured by both the Army and Air Force. As the program has developed since 2005, Congressional actions regarding JCA have been unpredictable at best. This paper seeks to make recommendations on the way ahead for the Air Force regarding JCA, but will look at the program through a Congressional lens. Starting with a discussion about the program as it currently exists, it will then address the multiple studies that have sought to inform the decision process, how Congress has funded the program to date, and most importantly, what issues are important to legislators who make the final decisions on defense programs. Finally, it will recommend what actions the Air Force should take regarding the overall JCA program.
During the most recent budget cycle, Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) garnered approval to purchase a gunship version of the C-27J, the same aircraft selected for the JCA contract. Although there have been some discussions regarding allowing two of the first seven aircraft being delivered to the Army to be diverted for AFSOC use, this plan has not yet been approved by Congress and no new contracts have been announced. 1 As such, the discussion that follows will not address potential AFSOC C-27Js, focusing only on the current JCA program of record for the Army and Air Force, and the aircraft they have contracted to date. 
JCA Program and Mission

Current Program
The JCA program is a joint effort (a merger of the Army Future Cargo Aircraft (FCA) and Air Force Light Cargo Aircraft (LCA) programs) to procure a commercial derivative aircraft for intra-theater airlift. The Army and Air Force each provide personnel to a joint program office with the Army serving as the lead, and the current acquisition program of record calls for a total of 78 aircraft.
The Army, which took delivery of its first aircraft in late 2008, will eventually acquire 54 aircraft. The Air Force plans to acquire its first aircraft in FY 2012 with an eventual fleet of 24 aircraft. The aircraft are a common configuration and the services will share systems for operational testing, aircrew and maintenance training, and depot maintenance.
Applicable Doctrine
Joint Publication 3-17 addresses Air Mobility Operations and identifies five basic airlift missions; passenger and cargo movement, combat employment and sustainment, aeromedical evacuation (AE), special operations support, and operational support airlift (OSA). 3 A JCA Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) signed by both services when the program was merged, specifies that the Army JCA will operate under the OSA mission area, while Air Force JCA will fly all other defined missions within a Joint Operations Area (JOA). 4 The definitions currently contained in joint doctrine are not a perfect fit for the JCA, and the different approaches to intratheater airlift by each service are discussed below.
Army Intra-theater Airlift Requirements
Joint doctrine does allow each service component to maintain a small fleet of aircraft to meet service-specific needs. 5 The MOA states the Army will use JCA for "direct support" of its ground operations by providing "on-demand transport of time-sensitive/mission-critical (TSMC) cargo and key personnel to forward-deployed Army units operating in a Joint Operations Area."
Although TSMC airlift is not specifically defined in joint doctrine, the Army primarily views JCA as on-call airlift directly tied to the tactical needs of ground commanders, sometimes referred to as transporting cargo the "last tactical mile." 6 In response to Congressional questions, 
Air Force Intra-theater Airlift Requirements
The Air Force, which is responsible for organizing, training, and equipping to perform airlift, views the JCA mission, including delivery of time-sensitive/mission-critical Army cargo, as its role. The MOA states the Air Force will use JCA to provide "general support" airlift for all users. Joint publications define this as "the airlift service provided on a common basis for all DoD agencies and, as authorized, for other agencies of the US Government" and assigns mission responsibility to U.S. Transportation Command. 9 Under this construct, the Air Force allocates available aircraft to all users in accordance with a Joint Force Commander's (JFC's) priorities;
the stated goal is efficient use of every aircraft for multiple tasks. In response to the same questions posed to the Army, the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff insisted that an Air Force JCA could provide general and direct support airlift, and do so more efficiently than the Army. While most details were classified, the study determined that C-27s were an efficient complement to other intra-theater platforms, but were not as cost-effective as operating the same number of C-130J aircraft. 11 The Air Force requested further study on possible mission activity where the C-27 may be more cost-effective, as well as comparisons to precision airdrop systems and recapitalizing CH-47s and/or C-23s. 12 In addition, tactical airlift requirements are part of a new Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study , currently in progress and due for initial release in summer 2009. 13 The difference between Army "direct support" and Air Force "general support" is fundamental to the overall roles and missions debate surrounding JCA. Additionally, the tactical airlift studies done by the Air Force play a large role in how Congress perceives the program.
These legislative issues will be addressed more comprehensively following some further details regarding studies and guidance from military leadership that have affected the JCA program. 
Studies and Guidance
Numerous studies since 1994 have attempted to establish the proper size and mix of aircraft fleets needed to meet the mobility requirements of US armed forces. Results from each study depend heavily on the assumptions made for force structure and the scenarios used to estimate needed airlift, and many of the studies do not address the time-sensitive "last tactical mile" mission envisioned for the JCA. This chapter will discuss airlift studies, some recent reports that address intra-theater airlift, as well as specific DoD guidance for the JCA which was recently released in the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review.
Multiple Mobility Studies
In 1994, the Joint Staff published a Mobility Requirements Study (MRS-05), based on late1990s force structure, that attempted to set the size of the airlift fleet. While it was primarily focused on strategic airlift, it did outline a rough size needed for the tactical airlift fleet of C- 
USAF Intra-theater Airlift Fleet Mix Analysis
The study, the USAF Intra-theater Airlift Fleet Mix Analysis ( partnerships around a common airframe. 3 The study results were not published as of this writing, but have been rumored to have found some areas where the JCA is more cost effective.
Size and Mix of Airlift Force Study
Congress, with language placed in the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, required the DoD to carry out a separate and extensive airlift requirements study and report the results by January 2009. 4 Among numerous requirements for the study was an analysis of the use of intertheater aircraft for intra-theater roles, as well as an assessment of the life-cycle costs of all airlift platforms, including the C-27J. USTRANSCOM, the lead on the study, contracted with the 
Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study
Intra-theater airlift decisions will also likely be affected by the ongoing Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study (MCRS-16), due to release preliminary results in the summer of 2009, with a final report by the end of this year. Led by DoD and USTRANSCOM, it is the largest comprehensive mobility study ever conducted and will recommend investment decisions on all airlift platforms and missions. 7 It is unclear what effect the MCRS-16 study will have on the JCA, and the multiple issues involved may be further complicated by rapidly changing defense budgets from a new Presidential administration, as well as an accelerated Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) that is intended to describe US force structure and potential threat scenarios on which much airlift analysis is based. AMC Commander, General Arthur Lichte, stated recently that "…it [the C-27] is not going to score very well because in every scenario it's cheaper to use the C-130J…but there is a need, and the latest study" validated the JCA requirement.
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Quadrennial Roles and Mission Review
The most definitive DoD guidance on the JCA program to date has come from the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review (QRMR). Also set by Congressional language in the 2008 defense authorization, DoD was required to identify core mission areas and competencies for each service, and to review roles and missions associated with some specific focus areas, one of which was intra-theater airlift. DoD acknowledged again the Army's requirement for delivery of time-sensitive/mission-critical (TSMC) cargo and set out an accepted but rather long definition for the term. More importantly for the services, the QRMR maintained the status quo with regard to intratheater airlift roles and missions. DoD evaluated four different options for assignment of the mission and found "…the option that provided the most value to the joint force was to assign the C-27J to the Air Force and the Army." 10 The QRMR then directed changes to each service's CONOPS to accommodate the compromise as well as updates to joint doctrine to include this new construct. The compromise for the Air Force will primarily be adjustments to ensure that they can fly "direct support" missions when requested by the Army, which could include operating under tactical control (TACON) of Army commanders. Conversely, the Army will have to ensure that its C-27s will be able to fill "general support" missions tasked by an overall air component commander when available, including compatibility with command and control systems that allow visibility of the mission by an overall airlift commander.
Air Force Chief of Staff General Norton Schwartz stated that the Air Force will not push further to claim the entire JCA mission from the Army and that "…I think the issues related to lift and particularly the C-27 have been resolved, certainly to my satisfaction. The FY 2008 Defense Authorization Act, however, restored the Army procurement funds, directing instead that DoD conduct a full roles and missions review to address the matter.
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Appropriators supported the President's procurement request, but did cut $21.3 million from Air
Force RDT&E as an "unjustified request". request, but cut all of the advance procurement funds and $10 million of RDT&E funds from the Air Force. 9 House authorizers explained these cuts by pointing to the results of the aforementioned IAFMA (where C-130Js were shown to be more cost-effective than C-27Js) and questioned the lack of proper analysis done to justify any Air Force procurement of JCA. 10 In the final appropriation bill, Congress supported the Army funding while removing Air Force advance procurement funds and $10 million in RDT&E money that was "unexecutable."
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Legislative Issues
Congressional actions on the JCA, as with most defense programs, are judged primarily by how much money is devoted to the platform or mission in a given year's defense budget. The decisions behind these funding amounts, however, represent many constituencies and are informed by debate on numerous other issues. In addition to the mobility studies outlined earlier, this chapter will look at issues important to Congress regarding the JCA, some of the competing arguments involved, and possible legislative outcomes.
Fiscal Constraints
Not surprisingly, the biggest Congressional issue for the JCA program is the total cost. HASC report criticized Army plans for using operations and maintenance (O&M) funds for purchasing JCA spares, support equipment, and simulators because those costs are harder to track, making it difficult to determine the true cost of each C-27J. 4 As can be seen in the previous chapter, however, changes made in the administration's budget request will not necessarily mean a change in how Congress funds the JCA program.
Roles and Missions
DoD Directive 5100.1 defines basic roles and missions, but is not definitive regarding airlift, giving all services the ability to field organic aircraft. 5 Congress has members on all sides of the issue regarding splitting tactical airlift between the Army and Air Force. Historically, the Army has successfully argued for ownership of a small fleet of tactical airlifters. Field commanders often state they need the responsiveness that "direct support" airlift provides to counter unforeseen contingencies. Some critics characterize this approach as inefficiently creating "two air forces." Others, however argue that the JCA simply maintains a status quo in roles and missions, i.e., "direct support" Army transport helicopters already perform TSMC movement of passengers and cargo and since the Army is responsible for sustaining its soldiers on the battlefield, it should be able to procure and use the most efficient vehicles (truck, helicopter, or fixed-wing aircraft) to perform this task.
The crux of the roles and missions debate, however, is command and control of these aircraft. Advocates of placing all C-27s in the Air Force point out that presently a Joint Force
Commander (JFC) can apportion tactical airlift into a "direct support" role whenever it is needed.
The Air Force has an extensive command and control architecture already established for the air mobility mission in any theater. Centralized control of all air assets is the primary tenet of this construct. Army commanders, however, normally function in an environment of decentralized control that would allow them to instantly task their own assets, but may leave the aircraft idle when not needed. The Army proposes that its aircraft will be available to the common-user airlift pool when not needed in a "direct support" role-this availability is now directed by the QRMR report-but it is not clear that the Army is committed to obtaining the necessary command and control systems needed to ensure the aircraft are both visible and usable by the JFC. Conversely, some support the Army's JCA program because they question the Air Force's long-term commitment to the "direct support" role, pointing out the Air Force has retired its last four small tactical airlift aircraft without replacement.
The roles and missions debate has elicited strong reactions from service leadership in the past. Army Secretary Pete Geren said in 2007, "the last tactical mile is an Army mission; it's not an Air Force mission, and we feel it's important that we control the decision-making and the assets for that." 
National Guard
The National Guard, both Army and Air Force, is vitally important to many members of Congress, and Guard missions are definitely an element of legislative JCA decisions. The Army National Guard operates their aging Sherpa aircraft in 18 different states and plans to replace the missions in many of those units with C-27s. 9 Similarly, the Air National Guard has plans to assign C-27s to units in at least six different states. 10 Former Chief of the National Guard Bureau, Lieutenant General Steven Blum, stated in 2006 that the JCA was "absolutely necessary" for Guard success and emphasized its utility in aiding FEMA operations like those supporting Hurricane Katrina relief.
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Although the Guard Bureau as a whole supports the procurement of the JCA, different service approaches appear here as well. In response to questions posed by Senator Carl Levin, General Richard Cody, Army Vice Chief of Staff, argued that JCA was much better suited for the Army National Guard as they are more focused on state missions, while the Air National Guard was more "federal." 12 The Air Force, in response to the same questions, disagreed, stating that Guard units activated for state missions would operate the JCA in the same manner regardless of service. 13 In any case, with the plans stated above now in place for C-27J Guard assignments, any decision by Congress to alter either the number or balance of aircraft to each service will likely face significant resistance from legislators in the affected states.
Building Partnership Capacity
While some in Congress will focus mostly on domestic issues when addressing the JCA, those who look towards military cooperation overseas and coalition building may be inclined to increase the Air Force portion of JCA procurement. Building partnership capacity (BPC) has become a major part of Air Force strategy and is likely to play an even bigger role as the United
States Africa Command expands its involvement across the continent. 14 Interoperability with airlift systems in other countries can help in many aspects of fighting the terror war, including obtaining basing and overflight rights, and opening diplomatic avenues that might otherwise stay closed.
The Air Force considers platforms like the C-27J important to BPC efforts, and its acquisition would allow the service to join other countries that have ordered or already operate the Spartan, including Bulgaria, Italy, Lithuania, Morocco, Greece, and Romania. 15 The US government has also offered the aircraft for sale through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, with potential customers in Australia, Taiwan, Qatar, and Ghana that may want aircraft with capabilities only available through FMS. 16 Several others-like Nigeria, Thailand, and Argentina-fly an older version of the aircraft, the G222 (also known as the C-27A), and Alenia North America announced late last year that it was contracted to provide 18 refurbished C-27As
to the fledgling Afghan Air Corps in Kabul.
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Industrial Base
A robust aircraft industry is important to many in Congress, and in the current economic environment, job creation and losses play an important part in legislative decisions. While the first 13 C-27Js ordered will be built in Italy, Alenia Aeronautica signed an agreement last year to build a final-assembly plant in Jacksonville, Florida that it states will be operational for the 14 th aircraft and beyond. 18 Florida estimates the plant will bring 300 jobs to the local area and over $100 million in capital investment to the county. 19 While the program is small compared to multi-state programs like the C-17 or F-22, the prospect of American jobs in the balance will also have an impact on Congressional discussions surrounding the JCA program.
As aircraft. CONOPS changes directed in the QRMR review would be made that allow the service to carry out TSMC movement when needed in a particular theater; agreements that the Air Force has already made. Plans for assigning aircraft to ANG units would be preserved and some expertise in C-27J operations would be gained that might benefit BPC efforts in Africa and other theaters. Further funds available past the 24 aircraft agreed to, however, should be put towards other Air Force priorities and new TSMC initiatives as described below.
If JCA is moved completely to the Air Force
With aircraft having already been delivered to the Army, this option seems almost as unlikely as full cancellation, but the Air Force should still plan for it. In this case, if Congress fully funded the planned 78 aircraft (24 plus 54 originally planned for the Army), the Air Force would need to complete the total procurement program and would encounter many of the same implementation effects mentioned in the joint section. However, with such a major change to the direction given in the QRMR review, the way the JCA would operate in theater would likely gravitate towards the Air Force "general support" model, even with agreements now in place to support Army TSMC movement. If this option were chosen, the Air Force should give the entire TSMC mission a fresh look and investigate other ways to accomplish it without being tied to a particular platform.
While the Air Force has done some recent studies to find specific scenarios where a C-27J might be optimal, most of the work done has shown that the C-130J is more cost effective over a variety of mission areas. 4 In his recent statements on the upcoming FY 2010 defense budget, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates discussed the importance of purchasing the right platforms for the complex "hybrid" warfare (both high-end and low-end threats) face by US forces today, and emphasized those that have value across multiple missions. 5 Scarce budget dollars for the JCA program should therefore be spent on airlift platforms that are proven to be cost-effective for multiple mission areas. In cases where those platforms can't properly support the Army's TSMC needs, other options should be considered, including Joint Precision Aerial Delivery System (JPADS) and even unmanned systems. JPADS has already proven successful in theater and combines cargo platforms, steerable parachutes, and GPS receivers to enable airdrops from high (and relatively safe) altitudes, delivering supplies and vehicles with pinpoint accuracy and with no runway needed. 6 With improving technology and ever-increasing military experience with unmanned systems, an automated vertical-lift cargo carrier seems to be another ideal way to deliver TSMC cargo, and this option is being pursued this year by the Marine Corps for the same mission. Vietnam, however, due to dwindling defense budgets the Air Force retired both the C-7 and C-123 without replacement.
In the 1980s, the Air Force procured a small fleet of C-23 Sherpas to move supplies between European bases. With the end of the Cold War, six Sherpas were transferred to the Army, who eventually acquired 40 more, assigning them primarily to Army National Guard units. 3 In 1991, the Air Force purchased 10 C-27A Spartans for operations around Howard Air Force Base, Panama, but these aircraft were retired in 1999 after the base closed. 4 Proponents of acquiring a new Army airlifter argued that operations in Iraq and Afghanistan stressed Army transport helicopters, amplified weaknesses of the aging Sherpa fleet the Army inherited, and exposed a capability gap within DoD. A comparison of the C-27J (JCA) with current and former Army airlifters in shown in Table 2 . In 2004, the DoD began to consider options to meet this possible capability gap. and subsequently L-3
Communications was awarded a $2.04 billion firm-fixed price contract to build up to 78 C-27Js, 54 for the Army and 24 for the Air Force. 12 The Army has already begun to take deliveries of the JCA, while the first Air Force aircraft is scheduled to be delivered in 2012. 
